rudolf p. botha

the world of language
2 its behavioural belt

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THE WORLD OF LANGUAGE

2   ITS BEHAVIOURAL BELT

by

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2   Language behaviour

In Carrollinian worlds, all sorts of creatures have the remarkable knack of appearing, as it were, from nowhere. For instance, soon after Alice had entered the world created by Gilbert Adair beyond a needle's eye, she witnessed how kittens and puppies, followed by cats and dogs, fell out of the sky:

> 'Hundreds of cats and dogs .... were pouring down as far as she could see. Once they landed, they would all make a rush for lower ground, gathering there in huddles --- "or *puddles*, I suppose one ought to say"   --- ....' [*TNE* 41]

In Needle's Eye World, one could accordingly say *It rained cats and dogs*, and mean it literally. But even in this curious place, one would have to be a lot madder than the Hatter to say *It rained linguistic utterances and intuitive judgements* and to mean that literally.   For here, as in the real world of language, linguistic utterances and judgements cannot come from nowhere. Nor have they been 'just there' all the time, patiently waiting to be pressed into service. In both worlds, these linguistic things are created by someone acting in a certain way. This means that linguistic reality must have a second, deeper, layer: a layer consisting of what people do so as to produce utterances, to assign meanings to utterances - henceforth 'comprehend' them - or to judge utterances intuitively. The actions they perform in producing, comprehending or intuitively judging utterances make up people's **language behaviour** (also called **linguistic** or **verbal behaviour**).   And the language behaviour of people forms a second layer of linguistic reality, the **layer of language behaviour.**

But what is the general nature of the actions that make up language behaviour? What are the more salient properties of language behaviour? And what kinds of language behaviour are to be found in the second layer of linguistic reality? These are the general questions which we will turn to next. In so doing, we will refer to someone's

producing, comprehending or intuitively judging an utterance as a **bit** or (more formally) an **act of language behaviour**.

2.1 General nature: unobservable action

The inhabitants of the various Carrollinian worlds turn out to be a quite vociferous lot: they often talk, converse, squabble, shout, cry and even mutter in a strikingly energetic way, using language with great gusto. Indeed, if one were to go by their actions, it would be tempting to conclude that language behaviour is a highly observable form of action. But this conclusion would be wrong. What, for example, can be seen or heard of the action involved in someone's comprehending the (Queen's) utterance *Off with her head!* or the utterance *'Sentence first - verdict afterwards'*. Likewise, what can be observed of the action involved in someone's intuitively judging the latter utterance to be good English, despite its saying something funny? What, for that matter, can be seen or heard of the action involved in the oral production of these two utterances? Apart from opening and closing mouths and moving lips, very little indeed. What can be heard represents the utterances --- that is, the products of the Queen's action --- and not the action itself. When people behave linguistically, what on the whole is observable is the product of their behaviour, not the action that makes up the behaviour. Language behaviour exists for most part as **unobservable action**.[1]

A piece of action, then, need not be observable to qualify as a bit of language behaviour. But can a piece of action manifest language behaviour if it does not feature in the production, comprehension or intuitive judging of an observable utterance? To see the point of this question, consider the following - a scene, which, incidentally, does not form part of any Alice adventure:

'Alice was still quite upset by the White Queen's unregal behaviour. "If I ever met her again", Alice thought, "I would say to her *A queen shouldn't behave like a witch*. And", Alice thought, "should the Queen turn purple again and scream in reply *How dare you call me a witch?! Off with her head!*, I would calmly say to her *Who's afraid of you? You're nothing but a silly old card!*"'

The italicized strings of words were not spoken aloud by Alice or the White Queen. These strings, accordingly, were not observable. Yet, they have all the other, nonphysical, properties of observable utterances: they are 'good English' in regard to form; they have a clear, nonanomalous meaning; they are used appropriately, and so on. What is more, in her mind, Alice could even have 'gone through the motions' of saying them, practising silently how to get the tone, emphases, pitches and so on of the first, fourth and fifth italicized strings just right for the particular occasion. Through her 'mind's ear' moreover, she could have heard the enraged Queen shrilly screaming the second and third italicized strings. This fictitious little Carrollinian scene serves to illustrate a general point: utterances can be produced in a **mental medium** as well as in a physical medium. As a matter of fact, people are all the time conducting conversations, arguments and so on 'in their heads', producing, comprehending and intuitively judging unobservable utterances in the process. The acts involved in this represent a kind of language behaviour called **internal** or **silent speech** by some.[2] The idea of an unobservable product of language behaviour is not a new one, of course: the meanings yielded by the comprehension of observable utterances are by their very nature unobservable entities in any event.

Utterances produced 'in the mind' should not be confused with thoughts or strings of words used to represent thoughts. To see this, consider the following passage from *Through the Looking-Glass* (p.197).

'"But oh!" thought Alice, suddenly jumping up, "if I don't make haste, I shall have to go back through the Looking-glass, before I've seen what the rest of the house is like. Let's have a look at the garden first!"'

The strings of words enclosed in the two pairs of double inverted commas represent thoughts of Alice's. Neither these thoughts nor these strings of words are observable utterances produced by Alice. And both the former thoughts and the latter strings of words are distinct from unobservable utterances produced in internal speech, utterances such as the italicized ones exchanged in the apocryphal altercation between Alice and the Queen. The italicized utterances, clearly, are not strings of words whose function it is to represent thoughts of Alice's or the Queen's.

2.2   Specific properties

2.2.1 Purposiveness

Language behaviour, then, involves the production, comprehension and intuitive judging of utterances. But should every act by means of which an utterance is produced be considered a bit of language behaviour? Suppose that, for short spells, the Mad Hatter slipped into a really 'deep' form of madness. Suppose moreover that during such spells, The Hatter, apparently oblivious of his surroundings, produced utterances such as the following:

The March Mouse has been of different colours in terms of black and white and I do not intend that futuramas of Alice's fixtures will ever be in the Hare's life again because I believe that all known Queens that would have its effect on me even the chemical reaction of tea acids are in the process of combustronability are blue to me.[3]

For what purpose are utterances such as these produced by seriously deranged people? Linguists would be hard-pressed to come up with a non-arbitrary answer. Some psychiatrists have speculated that certain schizophrenics produce such utterances for cutting themselves off from society in order to be unique. But many linguists would claim that this is not a normal purpose of language behaviour. This would mean that by producing utterances of the sort in question, a deranged person would, strictly speaking, not be behaving linguistically. (Normal) language behaviour is a kind of **purposive or intentional** action by means of which the language user tries to achieve one or more conventional goals. What this means, then, is that we have pinned down a first specific property of language behaviour: **purposiveness.**[4]

Like people living in our ordinary world, Carrollinian characters in general are highly versatile users of language. Indeed, their verbal actions strikingly illustrate the diversity of the purposes that bits of language behaviour can have. So let us examine some of the bits of linguistic action in which Alice and her companions engaged.

To begin with, consider 1:

1   *'I can't explain myself, I'm afraid, Sir,* said Alice, *because I'm not myself, you see'. [AIW* 67]

The italicized utterance above is one which Alice used for conveying something --- an idea or a belief --- to a companion, the Caterpillar. Alice's piece of action illustrates what has been called the **representational purpose** of language behaviour: people produce utterances in order to convey factual information, report or record events, describe things and so on. Incidentally, the fact that Alice's utterance conveyed an idea which made little sense to the Caterpillar does not mean that Alice did not use her utterance for the purpose of representation.

The utterance italicized in 2, however, was used by Alice for a different purpose:

2   *'Oh, you wicked little thing!* cried Alice, catching up the kitten, and giving it a little kiss to make it understand it was in disgrace'. [*TLG* 176]

This utterance Alice did not use for conveying an idea or a belief to some other language user. Rather, by producing this utterance Alice expressed a feeling or emotion which she also did by kissing the kitten. Alice's uttering of the italicized string of words, accordingly, exemplifies what has been called the **expressive** or **emotive purpose** of language behaviour.

But what was Alice attempting to do by producing the utterance italicized in 3?

3   *'Here are the Red King and the Red Queen,* Alice said (in a whisper, for fear of frightening them), *and there are the White King and the White Queen sitting on the edge of the shovel - and here are two Castles walking arm in arm - I don't think they can hear me ...'* [*TLG* 187]

Clearly, she was talking to herself. But for what purpose? Neither to convey a message to herself nor to express a feeling. The purpose of this bit of language behaviour by Alice is, rather, to help her clear her mind or to get a better mental picture of reality. The bit of language behaviour, thus, has what may be called a **cognitive** or an **intellectual purpose.**

The utterances italicized in 4 were addressed by a somewhat upset Alice to herself as well:

4   *'You ought to be ashamed of yourself,* said Alice, *a great girl like you,* (she might well say this), *to go on crying in this way! Stop this moment, I tell you!'* [*AIW* 36]

But was Alice trying to clear her mind or to aid her thinking by uttering the strings of words in question? It does not seem to be the case. This utterance appears to have been produced for a different purpose: to enable Alice to get a grip on her feelings and to influence her nonlanguage behaviour --- to stem the flow of her tears. Alice's producing of the utterance, accordingly, illustrates the so-called **regulatory purpose** of language behaviour, a purpose illustrated by the italicized utterances in 5 as well.

5   'And [as Alice and the Queen were running] the Queen seemed to guess her thoughts, for she cried *Faster! Don't try to talk!'.* [*TLG* 209]

As the Queen's utterances show, people may also act linguistically in an attempt to directly influence or control other people's behaviour. True, Alice was already panting from running, and could not run much faster; that, however, does not change the purpose for which the Queen uttered the strings italicized in 5.

One and the same bit of language behaviour can have more than one purpose, as is evidenced by the utterances italicized in 6.

6   *'In that case,* said the Dodo solemnly, rising to its feet, *I move that the meeting adjourn, for the immediate adoption of more energetic remedies -'.* [*AIW* 47]

Obviously, by uttering the italicized strings of words, the Dodo wished to influence the behaviour of other Wonderlanders: getting them to make an end to the meeting. But these utterances were used by the Dodo for another purpose as well: to reveal things about its personality (or its 'animality', if you wish). By speaking in a solemn tone of voice and by preferring long, learned words --- to simple, ordinary ones --- the Dodo was using language to reveal to his audience that he was a serious, and an intellectual, individual. That he succeeded in this is clear from the fact that he was brusquely told by the irritated Eaglet to 'Speak English!'. Through their language behaviour, people can indeed deliberately reveal various aspects of their personal identity: their ethnic origin, social class, sex, age, occupation, and so on. This is to say that language behaviour has a personal purpose as well.

Which brings us to the utterance italicized in 7.

7   *'Good-bye, till we meet again!* she [= Alice] said as cheerfully as she could [to Humpty Dumpty]'. [*TLG* 275]

The italicized utterance was not produced by Alice for any of the purposes considered above. Rather, she used it for a purpose that has been called 'social lubrication': oiling social relations, avoiding interpersonal friction, and so on. Social lubrication is an instance of the **interactional** or social **purpose** of language behaviour. This purpose, in general terms, is keyed to establishing and maintaining (good) social relations.

Let us turn now to the utterance italicized in 8:

8   *'You're my prisoner!* the Knight cried, as he tumbled off his horse'. [*TLG* 294]

On the face of it, this utterance looks like the one in 5 above: both seem to be aimed at regulating Alice's behaviour. In fact, however, the two utterances differ significantly in purpose. The utterance italicized in 8 is one which the Knight produced in order to do something to Alice in a practical way: to take away her freedom. And if the Knight had the right authority and acted in the proper way, his mere crying *You're my prisoner!* would indeed have taken Alice's freedom away from her. (Fortunately for Alice, the Knight's tumble from his horse stripped him of the required authority.) Bits of language behaviour with the aid of which people do practical things or make practical things happen have an instrumental purpose. Christening babies, sentencing criminals, knighting subjects, pronouncing a man and a woman to be husband and wife - all these are further typical examples of what people can do in a practical way by producing utterances.

But let us move on to a purpose of language behaviour that is quite different from the above ones, the **aesthetic purpose**. People can behave linguistically in order to create things they or other people experience as pleasing in some sense. The verses prefacing *Alice in Wonderland* and those terminating *Through the Looking-Glass* are products of just such language behaviour by Lewis Carroll. The latter verses close as follows ('they' referring to children):

9   *'In a Wonderland they lie,*
     Dreaming as the days go by,
     Dreaming as the summers die:

     Ever drifting down the stream -
     Lingering in the golden gleam -
     Life, what is it but a dream?'
                          [*TLG* 345]

Akin to the aesthetic purpose of language behaviour, illustrated by 9, is its ludic
purpose: people play games and have fun by behaving linguistically in certain ways.
For example, to tell how Alice, to her own 'amazement', had got lost in a maze,
Gilbert Adair playfully produced the following 'amazing' utterance:

10   Poor Alice! For if she'd only had a bird's-eye-view of
      the Maze,
          she would have realised that by

[the following text is arranged as a spiral/maze shape]

[*TNE* 112]

Producing utterances that are aesthetically pleasing or playful reflects, amongst other
things, the use of imagination. The aesthetic and ludic purposes of language behaviour
have, accordingly, been considered to be special cases of its imaginative purpose.

As illustrated by the opening lines of another Lewis Carroll poem, *Jabberwocky*,
language behaviour has more purposes than those considered above:

11   *'T'was brillig, and the slithy toves*
      Did gyre and gimble in the wabe:'

                    [*TLG* 270]

An expert at explaining 'all the poems that ever were invented --- and a good many that
haven't been invented just yet', Humpty Dumpty told Alice the following about
'toves': being something like badgers, something like lizards and something like
corkscrews, they make their nests under sundials and live on cheese.[5] The coining of
the word *toves* illustrates how people can use language for the purpose of naming
things --- real or fictitious --- so as to be able to think and talk about them.

Consider now Alice's account of the taste of a strange fluid: the fluid that came from a bottle labelled 'DRINK ME', and that made her shrink to only ten inches high:

> '... it had in fact a sort of mixed flavour of cherry-tart, custard, pine-apple, roast Turkey, toffy and hot buttered toast ...'

[*AIW* 31]

The words *cherry-tart, custard* and so on in this utterance of Alice's may seem to name qualities of the stuff she drank. But they don't really. Alice, in producing this utterance, was not trying to make true claims or factual statements about objectively identifiable qualities of a certain liquid. Indeed, it does not even make sense to ask whether the strange fluid really tasted like cherry-tart and so on. Rather, Alice was using the words *cherry tart, custard, pine-apple* etc. for the purpose of indicating to others certain (taste) sensations that she experienced when drinking the strange fluid. And she used these words in an attempt to trigger in others the same or similar sensations. That is, Alice used these words to interact with others - potential listeners or readers - at the level of the senses. Language, accordingly, is used here for a purpose that may be called **sensory interaction**.

Various interesting purposes of language behaviour have not been surveyed above: the purpose of coordinating people's movements to a common rhythm as they work or play together, of making people laugh, of injuring people spiritually, of robbing people of intangible possessions or qualities such as their power, their dignity or their very humanity. The list would be easy to extend. But doing so is unnecessary, since the main point should be clear: language behaviour is a species of multipurposive action.[6]

Before we proceed to a second specific property of language behaviour, note that the terms 'communication' and 'communicative' have not been used above for

characterizing any of the purposes of such behaviour. At first blush, perhaps, this seems quite odd. Scholars of many different kinds, after all, believe that language is used for the purpose of 'communication' and that language behaviour is accordingly a kind of 'communicative' behaviour. But what are 'communication' and 'communicative' supposed to mean in this context? There lies the rub. These terms have been used in various senses, a practice that has caused a lot of confusion. In one of the narrowest senses, the term communication has been used to mean 'the intentional transmission of factual information by means of some established signalling-system'. The representational purpose of language behaviour would be 'communicative' in this narrow sense. In one of its widest senses, by contrast, 'communication' has been commonly used to mean 'the conveying of any kind of information'. In this elastic sense, the term applies to many of the purposes that have been ascribed to language behaviour. There is obviously a wide diversity of kinds of information that can be conveyed by utterances, a point which we will take up again shortly. It is because of the confusion that so easily arises from the variable use of 'communication' and 'communicative' that these terms have been avoided above.[7]

Recall that in par. 1.2 the meaning of an utterance was characterized as the information conveyed by its signal. From our review of the purposes of language behaviour it is clear that utterances can state or otherwise convey various kinds of information: information about some factual state of affairs, about the speaker's feelings or emotions, about the speaker's social intentions, inclinations, relations, about the kind of person the speaker is, and so on. Extending this line of thinking in a natural way, many scholars distinguish among various kinds of meaning too, including factual (or descriptive) meaning, expressive (or emotive) meaning, social (or phatic) meaning, and so on.[8]

2.2.2 Cooperativeness

As is also evidenced by the Alice stories, much of language behaviour takes place in the so-called primordial or canonical setting of face-to-face conversation between two or more people. In this setting, language behaviour exhibits a second specific property: it is cooperative. But what does it mean to say that language behaviour is a kind of cooperative action? Basically two things, both of which can be characterized with reference to conversations between Alice and certain Wonderlanders.

In the course of the Mad Teaparty, a conversation took place about three little sisters who, according to the Dormouse, had lived at the bottom of a treacle (i.e., molasses) well. Consider the following fragment of this conversation:

'Why did they live at the bottom of a well?' [Alice asked]

The Dormouse again took a minute or two to think about it, and then said, "It was a treacle-well."

"There's no such thing!" Alice was beginning very angrily, but the Hatter and the March Hare went "Sh! Sh!" and the Dormouse sulkily remarked, "If you can't be civil, you'd better finish the story for yourself."

"No, please go on!" Alice said very humbly. "I won't interrupt you again. I dare say there may be *one.*"

"One, indeed!" said the Dormouse indignantly. However, he consented to go on. "And so these three little sisters - they were learning to draw, you know-"

"What did they draw?" said Alice, quite forgetting her promise.

"Treacle," said the Dormouse, without considering at all this time.

"I want a clean cup," interrupted the Hatter: "let's all move one place on."

[*AIW* 101-102]

This bit of conversation is interesting to us because of the poor language behaviour by Alice and the Hatter, who interrupted the Dormouse no less than three times. In not allowing the Dormouse to speak uninterruptedly, they acted in a distinctly uncooperative way. In a conversational setting, normal language behaviour is cooperative in that the participants neither all speak at once nor elbow their way into the discourse, rudely grabbing turns to speak whenever it pleases them. Rather, the participants take turns to speak in accordance with certain rules or conventions. So here is a first way in which language behaviour is cooperative: people generally obey **turn-allocation rules**, acting on signals given by the speaker --- called **turn-yielding cues** --- to the effect that his turn is over or that he wishes to keep the floor. These cues include rising or falling pitch at the end of a clause, pausing, 'drawling' of clause-final syllables and such nonverbal means as gazing and gesturing. And when they break a rule, they do so --- unlike Alice or the Hatter --- not out of social hamhandedness, rudeness or madness but rather in a deliberate way to achieve specific conversational ends. These ends include steering the conversation in a different direction, bringing the speaker back to the matter in hand, scoring debating points, taking the wind completely out of the speaker's sails, and so on. Incidentally, the general rule broken by Alice and the Hatter reads roughly as follows:

'Don't butt in on a conversation if the present speaker has not signalled the end of his/her turn.'[9]

Which brings us to a second way in which language behaviour is cooperative in a conversational setting: having been granted a turn to speak, a participant must say the right kind of thing, and must say it in the right way. But what do 'the right kind of thing' and 'the right way' mean? Put differently: what are the standards of behaviour to which people must conform in this regard?

Much of the humour in the Alice stories is rooted in Dreamworlders' (sometimes studied) inability either to say or ask the right thing, or to do so in the right way. The conversation between Alice and the blue hookah-smoking Caterpillar, who turned out to be a particularly brusque character, is delightfully instructive in this regard.[10] In response to the Caterpillar's question

> 'Who are *You*?'

Alice replied rather shyly:

> 'I - I hardly know, Sir, just at present - at least I know who I *was* when I got up this morning, but I think I must have been changed several times since then.'

As a reply to a simple request for identification, Alice's response is wrong in at least three ways: Firstly: it does not give the relevant information, thereby violating the rule of language behaviour known as the Maxim of Relation. Secondly: it gives too much information (of the wrong sort), thereby violating the Maxim of Quantity. Thirdly: what information it does give it gives in a confusing, obscuring way, thereby violating the Maxim of Manner. Predictably, the Caterpillar was unhappy with Alice's reply. And so she had to face his stern demand:

> 'What do you mean by that? Explain yourself!'

To which Alice responded:

> 'I can't explain *myself*, I'm afraid, Sir, because I am not myself, you see.'

This response of Alice's was equally unsatisfactory since it too did not contain the required, relevant information. And on top of that it was obscure, as is clear from the Caterpillar's terse rejoinder:

'I don't see.'

The point, then, is that in regard to what they say and how they say it, the participants in a conversation should behave cooperatively. In a nutshell, their language behaviour should conform to what is called the **Cooperative Principle:** 'Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged'.[11]

2.2.3 Space-time anchoredness

The above exchange between Alice and the Caterpillar illustrates a third specific property of language behaviour occurring in a conversational setting as well: it is **anchored in space and time.** The so-called spatio-temporal context of a bit of language behaviour is made-up of a number of participants in the changing roles of speaker and listener or addressee; a real or imaginary scene shared by the participants through their hearing, vision and other senses; the (shifting) places at which the participants find themselves within this scene; the point in time at which an utterance is produced; other utterances, whether produced before or after that point in time. Many utterances are anchored in the spatio-temporal context in an explicit way with the aid of specific words or expressions. Anchoring an utterance spatio-temporally is called **deixis** and the anchoring words and expressions are known as **deictic expressions.** Expressions like *you* and *me*, for example, establish **participant or person deixis;** *this* and *that* or *here* and *there*, for example, establish place deixis; and *at present* and *this morning* or *now* and *then*, for example, establish time deixis. In the Caterpillar's

question *What do you mean by that?*, *that* refers to the preceding utterance by Alice, thereby establishing **discourse deixis.**

Used uncooperatively, deictic expressions cause confusion, disorientation and frustration. This Alice experienced at first hand when, having got lost in Gilbert Adair's maze, she found at certain forks signposts reading as follows

12a   'THIS WAY? OR THAT WAY? (with two arrows pointing in opposite directions)

b   'HITHER' (with an arrow pointing in one direction) and

c   'THITHER' (with an arrow pointing in the other)

d   'YOU ARE HERE' (and underneath in brackets) 'ELSEWHERE 500 YARDS' [*TNE* 105-107]

Not referring to a place known by Alice too, these deictic expressions, of course, did not help her one bit to get out of the maze. They rather caused her to wonder and daydream:

'But would I prefer to go Hither or Thither? .... Now Hither does sound a little closer than Thither and even if I don't know what it is, it might be an advantage to get there sooner, you know. On the other hand, Thither sounds more interesting somehow, and perhaps no human being has ever set foot on it before. Then I'd become a sort of explorer .....' [*TNE* 106]

Having dreamt further of being crowned Queen Alice the First, of ruling the Thitherians for thirty-three years, and of declaring war on the Hitherians, Alice finally realized that 'all this nonsense I'm talking isn't going to get me anywhere at all.' Her woes, of course, were caused by the uncooperative language behaviour of whoever had

put up the confusing signs: deictic expressions of place cannot be used effectively in the absence of a shared spatial frame of reference.[12]

2.2.4 Nonlinguistic embeddedness

The setting in which a bit of conversation takes place normally comprises a further element: acts of a nonlinguistic sort performed by the participants in the conversation. Consider in this connection some of the utterances which were produced by Wonderlanders during the trial of the Knave of Hearts, who stood accused of having stolen the tarts made by the Queen of Hearts:

13a   "I'm a poor man, your Majesty." [p.149]

  b   "I'd rather finish my tea." [p.150]

  c   "Well, if I must [cross-examine the witness], I must." [p.151]

  d   "Consider your verdict." [p.156]

  e   "Oh, I beg your pardon!" [p.153]

  f   "*Un*important, your Majesty means of course." [p.155]

  g   "That's the most important piece of evidence we've heard yet." [p.159]

  h   "Do I look like it [i.e., being able to swim]?" [p.159]

  i   "It's a pun!" [p.160]

  j   "Off with her head!" [p.161]

                    (All the above page references are to *AIW*.)

The uttering of 13a-j was intertwined with bits of nonlinguistic behaviour conveying information about the feelings, thoughts and desires of the various speakers. These bits of nonlinguistic behaviour are described by Carroll in 14a-j, respectively. The dots "....." mark the places where the utterances 13a-j slot into 14a-j, respectively.

14a   'The miserable Hatter dropped his teacup and bread-and-butter, and went down on one knee. "....."' [p.149]

   b   '"....." , said the Hatter, with an anxious look at the Queen, who was reading the list of singers.' [p.150]

   c   '"....." , the King said with a melancholy air...'. [p.151]

   d   'The King turned pale, and shut his notebook hastily. "....." , he said to the jury, in a low trembling voice.' [p.156]

   e   '"....." she exclaimed in a tone of great dismay...' [p.153]

   f   '"....." , he [= the White Rabbit] said in a very respectful tone, but frowning and making faces at him [= the King] as he spoke.' [p.155]

   g   '"....." , said the King, rubbing his hands;' [p.159]

   h   'The Knave shook his head sadly. "....." he said.' [p.159]

   i   '"....." the King added in an angry tone, and everybody laughed.' [p.160]

   j   '"....." the Queen [just having turned purple] shouted at the top of her voice.' [p.161]

Central to the bits of nonlinguistic behaviour described in 14 are the quality of the speaker's voice ('low trembling voice', 'tone of great dismay', 'respectful tone', 'angry tone', 'at the top of her voice'), the speaker's gestures ('rubbing his hands', 'making faces', 'shook his head sadly'), the speaker's (changing) facial expression ('melancholy air', 'frowning'), the speaker's gaze ('anxious look'), the speaker's posture and body orientation ('down on one knee'). Each of these bits of nonlinguistic behaviour conveys something too. For example, the various tones described above convey fear, dismay, respect or anger; the gestures convey satisfaction, dissent, sorrow, and so on. Such bits of nonlinguistic behaviour, moreover, affect --- modulate, fill out, amplify, weaken, relativize, etc. --- the meaning of the utterances which they accompany. Take, for example, the utterance *It's a pun!* [= 13i] and insert it consecutively into the slot marked by the dots "....." in 14a-j respectively. Though the basic statement expressed

by *It's a pun!* remains the same, the listener's interpretation of this utterance is affected by the speaker's tone of voice, gestures, gaze, posture, body orientation and so on. For example, exclaimed in a tone of great dismay, the utterance *It's a pun!* is understood roughly as meaning 'It is a pun and I am dismayed by this fact'. Spoken by someone rubbing his/her hands, this utterance is understood as meaning 'It is a pun and I am happy with this fact'.

13a-j and 14a-j, then, graphically illustrate a fourth specific property of (conversational) language behaviour: its embeddedness in nonlinguistic behaviour. From the examples it is clear how bits of language behaviour are 'fine-tuned' by accompanying nonlinguistic acts performed by speakers. The meaning of an utterance can be affected in a much more radical way, however, by the nonlinguistic behaviour in which it is embedded. Thus consider the following two contexts of nonlinguistic behaviour in which the sentence *Off with her head!* may be uttered:

> 15a 'Whilst making a chopping movement in the direction of the Duchess, the apoplectic Queen shrieked with a murderous look in her eye: ".....""
>
> b 'Whilst gently rocking her baby, the Queen crooned in a soothing tone with a loving smile on her lips: ".....""

The inherent meaning of the sentence *Off with her head!* remains the same. Yet in the nonlinguistic contexts of 15a and 15b the two utterances of *Off with her head!* differ radically in meaning. In the case of 15a, the accompanying nonlinguistic acts performed by the Queen make the literal meaning of 'she must be beheaded' a quite plausible utterance meaning. In the case of 15b, by contrast, the accompanying nonlinguistic acts rule out this literal utterance meaning. This illustrates the extent to which language behaviour can be affected by the nonlinguistic behaviour in which it is embedded.[13]

We have reached a point where it may be useful to glance both back and ahead. So far we have considered four of the more specific properties of language behaviour: its purposiveness, cooperativeness, spatio-temporal anchoredness and embeddedness in nonlinguistic behaviour. These last three properties are instances of a more general property: much of language behaviour is **contextualized**. These three properties characterize what may be informally called a 'more outward side' of language behaviour. Language behaviour has a 'more inward side' as well, however, one not reflecting the ways in which language behaviour is contextualized. Rather, the 'more inward side' of language behaviour reflects the 'creative aspect of language use', to use an expression of Noam Chomsky's. We turn next to four of the properties that characterize this side of language behaviour.

2.2.5 Innovativeness

Consider the following utterances, all from *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland*:

16a She soon made out that she was in the pool of tears that she had wept when she was nine feet high. [p.40]

  b At last the Caterpillar took the hookah out of his mouth, and addressed her in a languid, sleepy voice ... [p.67]

  c The roses growing on it were white, but there were three gardeners at it, busily painting them red. [p.105]

  d The executioner's argument was that you couldn't cut off a head unless there was a body to cut it off from ... [p.116]

  e The jury eagerly wrote down all three dates on their slates, and then added them up, and reduced the answer to shillings and pence. [p.146]

These utterances have the property of being novel: it is highly unlikely that they were produced before by Lewis Carroll or anybody else for that matter. Yet there is no reason to believe that Carroll found it particularly hard to produce these utterances --- his Alice stories bristle with such strikingly novel utterances. And generations of Carroll readers (fluent in English) have been able to understand these utterances without apparent difficulty, despite their novelty. Novelty is by no means a property restricted to written utterances of a 'literary' sort. As has been stressed since the fifties by Chomsky, the vast majority of spoken utterances are novel too. Indeed, few of the utterances regularly produced and comprehended by people are ones that they have used before, ones that they have somehow kept in store, ready in a 'prefab' form to be used a second or third time. People generally behave in a linguistically innovative way, producing and comprehending novel utterances as a matter of course. **Innovativeness** is indeed the most striking of the 'more inward' properties of language behaviour that we will consider. What the innovativeness of language behaviour involves is that 'the normal use of language is unbounded in scope', to use another expression of Chomsky's.[14]

2.2.6 Stimulus-freedom

A related 'more inward' property of language behaviour, singled out by Chomsky, is that it is **stimulus-free**: it is not controlled by stimuli outside or inside people. This property of language behaviour is beautifully illustrated by an episode in Alice's journey through Looking-Glass Country. In that episode Alice, boarding a train without having bought a ticket, offers the disgruntled Guard the excuse that "There wasn't a ticket-office where I came from". Consider now some of the utterances produced by the Guard and Alice's fellow-travellers in response to this excuse.

17a   The Guard: 'Don't make excuses ... you should have bought one from the engine driver ... You're travelling the wrong way' [*TLG* 217-218]

b   Gentleman Traveller: 'So young a child ... ought to know which way she's going, even if she doesn't know her own name!' [*TLG* 218]

c   A Goat Traveller: 'She ought to know her way to the ticket-office, even if she doesn't know her alphabet!' [*TLG* 218]

d   A Beetle Traveller: 'She'll have to go back from here as luggage!' [*TLG* 219]

e   Traveller with a gentle voice: 'She must be labeled "Lass, with care", you know ...' [*TLG* 219]

f   Traveller X: 'She must go by post, as she's got a head on her ...' [*TLG* 219]

g   Traveller Y: 'She must be sent as a message by the telegraph ...' [*TLG* 219]

h   Traveller Z: 'She must draw the train herself the rest of the way ...' [*TLG* 219]

The utterances 17a-g are all evoked by the same stimulus: Alice's excuse for her not having bought a ticket. But these utterances are strikingly dissimilar, both in meaning and in form or expression. If language behaviour were under stimulus-control, Alice's travelling companions would all have to produce the same utterance in response to her excuse. It is typical of linguistic behaviour that the utterances produced by a speaker on a given occasion cannot be predicted on the basis of linguistic stimuli --- previously produced utterances.   Nor can they be predicted on the basis of nonlinguistic stimuli coming from inside or outside speakers. Since language behaviour is not subject to stimulus-control, it is possible for people to use their language, in the absence of any identifiable stimuli, for purposes such as thinking, self-expression, and so on.[15]

2.2.7 Appropriateness

Suppose that, in response to Alice's excuse for not having bought a ticket, the following two utterances were produced as well:

18a   Gnat Traveller: 'You might make a joke on that -- something about "horse" and "hoarse", you know.' [p.219]

b   Horse Traveller: 'It is only a brook that we have to jump over'. [p.220]

Though being both good English and novel, these two utterances differ in an important way from those presented in 17a-h. In the given context, the latter utterances represent perfectly appropriate reactions to Alice's excuse. But even in a dream world, the utterances of 18a and b are not appropriate as reactions to this excuse. **Being appropriate** is considered by Chomsky to be a property of language behaviour that is related to but distinct from novelty and freedom from stimulus-control. Normal language behaviour --- or 'language use', in Chomsky's terminology --- is appropriate to situations that evoke but that do not control or cause it. What precisely appropriateness consists in has been a mystery to generations of linguists. Nevertheless it is clear that, as a 'more inward' property of language behaviour, appropriateness is linked to the 'more outward' property of cooperativeness: a speaker cannot be cooperative if he/she says things that are not appropriate. Chomsky's notion of appropriateness and Grice's idea of relation (or relevance) appear, in other words, to be two sides of the same coin.[16]

As properties of language behaviour, innovativeness, freedom from stimulus control and appropriateness belong to the same cluster. These properties are related in that each of them contributes to what Chomsky has called 'the creative aspect of language use'. The idea that language use has a creative aspect goes back at least to Descartes and his followers, who invoked it as a basis for distinguishing between humans and

.

animals. In their view animals, unlike humans, lack the ability to use language creatively.[17]

2.2.8 Rule-governedness

To say that people use language creatively is not to say that they can do just what they please when producing or comprehending utterances. For example, Alice's fellow-travellers were not really free to understand her excuse (repeated as 19a) as meaning either 19b or 19c.

    19a   There wasn't a ticket office where 1 came from.

       b   The land there is worth a thousand pounds an inch.

       c   She should have bought a ticket from the engine-driver.

Nor was the Guard, the Goat or the Beetle really free to produce the utterances 17a, 17c and 17d in the form of 20a, 20b and 20c, respectively.

    20a   Make don't you ... excuses have should one bought the from driver engine.

       b   She ought her way to know ticket-office to the, she doesn't even if her alphabet know.

       c   Luggage as here from back go to have she'll.

The fact that a wilful person cannot arbitrarily take 19a to mean 19b or 19c and the fact that 17a, 17c and 17d cannot be arbitrarily uttered as respectively 20a, 20b and 20c illustrate a fourth 'more inward' property of language behaviour: it is **lawful**. Or, as Chomsky has put it, the use of language is **rule-governed**: utterances are produced and comprehended in accordance with the rules of the language. And this is true even of

make-believe worlds: none of the many extraordinary Carrollinian creatures behave linguistically in a lawless way. Not even the mad ones or, for that matter, Humpty Dumpty who boasted:

> 'When *I* use a word - it means just what I choose it to mean - neither more nor less.' [*TLG* 271]

Humpty did claim that he could make words do a lot of additional work by paying them extra when they came round on Saturday nights to get their wages; he never actually, though, put his money where his mouth was. The utterances he used when conversing with Alice were in fact squarely governed by the rules of English both in regard to expression (or form) and in regard to meaning.[18]

People cannot break the laws of nature; people can however, consciously or unconsciously, break the rules governing the production and comprehension of utterances. Someone who violates these rules runs the risk, though, of not understanding what others mean or of not being understood by others. This is one of the reasons why, when they realize that they have inadvertently broken a rule, people try to repair the damage. They can take corrective action by rerouting a derailed utterance in mid-course or by leaving a derailed utterance unfinished and by starting a new one from scratch, and so on.[19]

2.3   Kinds of language behaviour

In the course of a rather trying encounter in Needle's Eye World, Jack got Alice to sing the little poem *Jack and Jill went up the hill* 'backwards':

'Back uphill rolled Jack and Jill

Until Jack's crown was mended

They poured the pail down the well,

Then backwards redescended.' [*TNE* 93]

(If Gilbert Adair is to be believed, the tune went a little like *I dreamt I dwelt in marble halls*, a little like *Pop Goes the Weasel*, and whenever it wasn't like either of these, it sounded just like *God Save the Queen*.) What is more, giving in to Jack's prodding, Alice recited the poem in question in passable French, translating it as she went along. These two examples further show just how varied Alice's language behaviour was.

The kinds of language acts performed by ordinary people living in ordinary places is even more diverse. Think in this regard of the auctioneer attempting feverishly to inject some life into a spell of sluggish bidding, of the Pope solemnly intoning a formal prayer, of the fans joining in the action at Wembley by producing in unison their 'tribal' chants and taunts, of a Judge President pronouncing in measured tones the death sentence in a hushed court room, of a Paris mob baying for Marie Antoinette's head.

Can the seemingly endless variety of acts of language behaviour be seen as instances of a limited number of major kinds? If so, what are the major kinds of language behaviour in which people engage? We will focus on these questions below from the perspective of a distinction among forms, means and modes of language behaviour.

2.3.1 Forms of language behaviour

One cannot have a genuine Carrollinian story in which there is not a little girl doing adventurous things, thinking funny thoughts or conducting strange conversations with all sorts of curious creatures. Likewise, one cannot have a bit of language behaviour

without people producing utterances, people comprehending utterances or people intuitively judging utterances. Producing, comprehending and intuitively judging utterances may consequently be taken to be the basic forms of language behaviour. To call these forms of language behaviour "basic" is not, however, to say that they involve actions or processes that are simple or transparent at a microscopic level. It may seem 'obvious' or 'clear' what people do when they speak to others or when they listen to others; discovering the mechanics of speaking and listening (in the sense of comprehending) is a highly complex task, though, and demands the use of sophisticated forms of inquiry. Fortunately, our concern with the production, comprehension and intuitive judging of utterances requires no more than macroscopic inspection of these three forms of language behaviour.

2.3.1.1   Producing utterances

Producing an utterance such as *The March Hare dipped the watch into his cup of tea* has conventionally been thought of as 'transforming' an unobservable message into a stretch of observable speech, writing or signing. And what someone does in producing an utterance has been taken to involve four macroscopic processing activities: conceptualizing, formulating, externalizing, and self-monitoring. In what follows, people engaged in the production of utterances --- speakers in the case of spoken utterances, writers in the case of written utterances and signers in the case of signed utterances --- will collectively be referred to as producers (of utterances).

Conceptualizing includes everything that the producer has to do in planning and putting together what is called a 'preverbal message'. A preverbal message consists of what the producer intends to utter or convey: knowledge, thoughts, feelings, wishes, intentions, sensations and so on. As for formulating, it is done in terms of two kinds of encoding. Through the first, called grammatical encoding, the preverbal message is

'hooked on to' a formal 'bearer': a string of words organized into what is called a 'surface structure'. The structured string of words is paired by means of the second kind of encoding with an externalizing plan. An externalizing plan contains instructions to those parts of the producer's neural and muscular system that help deliver the utterance by means of speaking, writing or signing. **Externalizing** the utterance consists in executing the latter plan: the structured string of words is rendered observable as a stretch of sounds, characters (letters, punctuation marks) or signs. In the case of speaking, the second kind of encoding is called **phonological encoding** and the externalizing of spoken utterances is conventionally referred to as **articulating**. The product of articulating is called **overt speech**.

Finally, through **self-monitoring** the producer checks whether he/she is conceptualizing, formulating and externalizing the utterance correctly. Monitoring allows the producer to detect and repair errors in a flash. The Red Queen was mistaken, therefore, when she told the floundering Alice that

'... when you've once said a thing, that fixes it, and you must take the consequences'. [*TLG* 323]

The Red Queen's rebuke, incidentally, was sparked by Alice's detecting and repairing an error that she had made in conceptualizing something that she wanted to say:

'"The cause of lightning," Alice said very decidedly, for she felt quite certain about this, "is the thunder - no, no!" She hastily corrected herself. "I meant the other way."' [*TLG* 323]

Whatever the cause of lightning may be in a world that has been stood on its head, detecting and repairing errors are part and parcel of producing utterances.[20]

2.3.1.2   Comprehending utterances

Comprehending an utterance such as *The March Hare dipped the watch into his cup of tea* is aimed at recovering from the uttterance the message encoded in it by its producer. People engaged in the comprehension of utterances - listeners in the case of spoken utterances, readers in the case of written utterances, and 'seers' in the case of signed utterances - will in what follows be referred to collectively with the aid of the (somewhat awkward) expression comprehenders (of utterances).

It would be wrong to oppose the comprehension of utterances as a passive form of language behaviour to the production of utterances as an active one. Comprehending utterances is as active a business as producing them: making out the meaning of utterances is often quite taxing and may, in fact, be tiring. This is so even in dream worlds, as is illustrated by Alice's reading of the poem *Jabberwocky*, which both opens and closes with the following stanza:

'"Twas brillig, and slithy toves

Did gyre and gimble in the wabe:

All mimsy were the borogoves,

And the mome raths outgrabe.' *[TLG* 191, 197]

Alice found this poem 'very pretty' indeed, but 'rather hard to understand': it seemed 'to fill her head with ideas'; only, she did not 'exactly know what they are'. 'You see', Lewis Carroll confided in an aside to his readers, 'she didn't like to confess, even to herself, that she couldn't make it out at all.' [*TLG* 197]

It must be all the unfamiliar words --- *brillig, slithy, toves,* and so on --- that made it so hard for Alice to comprehend the utterances forming the poem, you may think.[21] This

is partly true. But even utterances that contain no strange words may be hard 'to make out'. To see this, try comprehending the following utterances:

21a   *The cat the executioner the queen employed beheaded grinned.*

b   *The Queen hit the hedgehog hit it.*

c   *The King's horses galloped through the rose garden stumbled.*

These utterances certainly contain no outlandish words; what is more, they are formed in accordance with the rules of English. Still comprehending them requires quite hard work. Or didn't you stumble too in trying to get at their meaning?[22]

But what are the macroscopic processing activities --- or processes, as they are also called --- involved in the comprehension of utterances? The following four figure centrally in many models of comprehension: perception, recognition, parsing, and meaning assignment. In perception a comprehender identifies certain noises as speech sounds, certain marks on a surface as units of writing or certain hand and other movements as units of signing. In recognition the comprehender decides, on the basis of the perceived sounds, marks or movements and various other cues what the words are that have been uttered. In parsing the comprehender determines how a sequence of recognized words is internally organized or structured. **Meaning assignment** can be seen as having two basic aspects: interpretation and understanding. A comprehender works out the interpretation of a parsed sequence of words by taking into account, generally unconsciously, the meaning of individual words and the relations holding among the words. To arrive at an understanding of an utterance, the comprehender makes its interpretation mesh with information from a variety of other sources of meaning. The latter include the nature of the speech act performed by the producer, the linguistic and non-linguistic context in which the utterance is produced, including the nonverbal behaviour that makes up the producer's body language, the knowledge which comprehender and producer have of each other, and so on. At a microscopic level,

perception, recognition, parsing and meaning assignment are highly complex activities or processes made up of subactivities or subprocesses that are not yet fully understood. In addition, in the comprehension of utterances, these four macroscopic activities or processes interact in intricate ways about which scholars disagree on fundamental points.[23]

2.3.1.3   Judging utterances

As a judge, the King of Hearts was a rather schizoid character. He could not make up his mind about whether the Knave of Hearts was really guilty of stealing some tarts. Yet at the same time, he had no problem in passing judgement on the speech of one of the witnesses, telling the Hatter twice: "You're a *very* poor *speaker*". In making this linguistic judgement, the King acted just like ordinary people who regularly judge the properties of linguistic utterances in an intuitive way. Since this form of linguistic behaviour has not been studied in any great depth, we will be able to characterize it below in the most general of terms only, proceeding from the following questions: What are the more evident properties of the activity or process of judging linguistic utterances intuitively? Who is able to engage in this form of language behaviour? How is the intuitive judging of utterances interrelated with their production and comprehension? We will consider these questions against the background of par. 1.3, which contains various examples of intuitive linguistic judgements.

So what are the general features of a bit of behaviour or act such as the one that produces a judgement to the effect that the utterance *The Gnat sighed itself* is not (good) English? First, this is not an act in which people inspect something --- the utterance --- with the aid of the senses. The property of '(not) being good English' is not observable. Intuitively judging the properties of utterances is not, therefore, a form of perception. **Perception**, roughly, boils down to the observation of something

material by means of the senses, with or without the aid of instruments. Obviously, judging utterances intuitively presupposes perception: someone cannot judge an utterance intuitively unless he/she has heard or seen it. But this does not make such judging a kind of perception. Both the mind's eye and the mind's ear, incidentally, function in the case of internal or silent speech as sense organs too.

Second, people are not conscious or aware of how they proceed in making an intuitive judgement of an utterance. In this respect, such judging or 'intuiting' contrasts with the mental activity known as 'introspection'. Some scholars think of **introspection** as the conscious taking of 'mental meter readings': people consciously inspect, analyze and so on the content of their mind, including their experiences, thoughts, feelings, wishes, desires, and so on.[24]

Alice, as you may know, was a little girl given to frequent bouts of introspection: delving into her own feelings, wondering about this and that, thinking things over --- often talking to herself in the process. For example, when her continual growing and shrinking had brought on an identity crisis, she dealt with this in a typically introspective fashion:

'... as the hall was very hot, she kept fanning herself all the time she went on talking. "Dear, dear! How queer everything is today! And yesterday things went on just as usual. I wonder if I've changed in the night? Let met think: *was* I the same when I got up this morning? I almost think I can remember feeling a little different. But if I'm not the same, the next question is, 'Who in the world am I?' Ah, *that's* the great puzzle!" And she began thinking over all the children she knew that were of the same age as herself, to see if she could have been changed for any of them.' [*AIW* 37]

Clearly, an introspective judgement such as 'I am not sure who I am' and an intuitive judgement such as 'The utterance *I am not sure who I am* is good English' are as different as chalk and cheese, both in what they are about and in how they came into existence. It is of course possible to dwell introspectively on one's own intuitive judgements too: on their content, their origin, and so on. But the activity or process of making such judgements is not thereby changed into a form of introspection.

Third, people do not arrive stepwise at an intuitive judgement of an utterance. On the contrary, such judging is done in a rapid, flashlike way. In this respect, it contrasts with **analytic thinking**, which characteristically proceeds by way of a chain of explicit, well-defined steps of which the thinker is aware. Consider two cases in point: the ways in which the executioner and the Red King argued about the possibility of beheading the Cheshire Cat after the latter's body had already vanished:

> 'The executioner's argument was, that you couldn't cut off a head unless there was a body to cut if off from ... .
>
> The King's argument was, that anything that had a head could be beheaded ... .' [*AIW* 116-117]

Though the ideas involved in these two arguments are amusing, both reflect (simple) bits of analytic thinking that may be reconstructed as follows:

The executioner's thinking

Premise 1:   You cannot cut off a head unless there is a body to cut it off from.

Premise 2:   The Cheshire Cat does not have a body (at the present moment).

Conclusion: Therefore, the Cheshire Cat cannot be beheaded (at the present moment).

The King's thinking

Premise 1:   Anything that has a head can be beheaded.

Premise 2:   The Cheshire Cat has a head.

Conclusion: Therefore, the Cheshire Cat can be beheaded.

Unlike argued-for views such as the two above, intuitive linguistic judgements do not have the nature of conclusions deduced from premises in a conscious step-by-step fashion. Once a particular intuitive judgement has been made, however, the judge can of course try to justify it afterwards by citing premises from which it follows (or appears to follow) as a conclusion. But this does not mean that the activity or process of intuitive judging is itself a kind of analytic thinking. People who do not have the right kind of training in linguistics will normally have no idea of the considerations that may be properly used as premises in such arguments.[25]

Fourth, judging an utterance intuitively cannot be done in a vacuum: it requires knowledge of the language in which the utterance was produced. If someone does not know Tohono O'odham, for example, it is impossible for him/her to judge that, in contrast to utterance 25b, utterance 25a is well-formed.

25a	*Huan*	*'o*	*wakon*	*g-ma:gina.*
	'John'	'is/was'	'washing'	'the car'

b	**Huan*	*g-ma:gina*	*'o*	*wakon.*
	'John'	'the car'	'is/was'	'washing'[26]

Judging utterances intuitively is not, therefore, a kind of activity in which someone's fantasy, imagination or some similar capacity is given free reign. Nor is it an exercise that draws on special 'powers' such as those that oracles, shamans or divinely inspired prophets are supposed to have. Judging utterances intuitively is constrained, rather, by

a kind of knowledge to the nature of which we will turn after gathering together the threads of our reflections on the general features of this activity or process. As a form of language behaviour, judging utterances intuitively, then, is neither a mode of sensory perception nor a kind of introspection nor a species of analytic thinking. Rather, it represents a process of immediate apprehension which in a flash produces tentative insights or beliefs in people who have a certain kind of knowledge of language.[27]

So what do people have to know to be able to judge utterances intuitively? Alternatively: Who are the people capable of such judgemental language behaviour? The answer may seem evident: Ordinary people can judge utterances intuitively on the basis of the knowledge that enables them to produce and comprehend utterances in a language. This answer has been rejected, however, by scholars who have maintained that only people who know the 'rules' of a language formally taught in schools or other institutions are capable of normatively judging utterances produced in the language.

The latter position, however, is surely wrong. Thus, as noted in par. 2.3.1 above, self-monitoring is part and parcel of the production of utterances. Recall that such self-monitoring boils down to the flashlike detection and repair of errors. As is clear from the literature, the former detection of errors is an instance of the intuitive judging of (parts of) utterances: it involves the immediate apprehension of mostly unobservable properties of (fragments of) utterances.[28] And there is no evidence that such self-monitoring is restricted to people who can read and write or to people who have received formal instruction in the 'rules' of the language.

Moreover, listening closely to certain conversations one cannot fail to notice that ordinary people monitor one another's speech too. Indeed, in recording as follows a bit of verbal interaction between Alice and a Country Mouse, Gilbert Adair describes a kind of language behaviour that is by no means peculiar to Carrollinian characters:

'I never knew such a comet for wiggling and wriggling," said the Mouse in a crotchety voice: "and why you 'ad to choose *my* haystack to fall into -"

Alice was just about to insist that, for one thing, she was *not* a comet and, for another, she certainly hadn't *chosen* to fall into this or any other haystack, when she suddenly made out what it was in the Mouse's speech (apart from its being able to speak at all) that was puzzling her so: and, before she could stop herself, she blurted out, "How is it that you say ''ad' instead of 'had' and ''oped' instead of 'hoped', just like the road-sweeper does, yet you always manage to pronounce *haystack* correctly - "' [*TNE* 15]

Like the linguistically untrained Alice, ordinary people can and do judge utterances produced by other who speak or try to speak their language. Think in this regard of fluent speakers of a language judging (and sometimes correcting) utterances produced by nonfluent foreigners. Likewise, speakers of a prestigious form of a language such as English are known to judge intuitively --- and to comment unfavourably on --- utterances produced by speakers whose variety of the language, like the Country Mouse's Cockney, is looked down on.

How is the intuitive judging of utterances interlinked with the production and comprehension of utterances? This is a question we have yet to consider. The impression may have been created above that the intuitive judging of utterances is an entirely isolated form of language behaviour. But this is not so; after all, such judging takes place in self-monitoring too. And self-monitoring, in turn, is involved in the production of utterances. What is more, self-monitoring presupposes the perception, parsing and interpretation by the monitor-cum-producer of his/her internal speech. Which means that production is not a completely self-contained form of language behaviour either: in the context of self-monitoring it presupposes comprehension. In

short, to call a form of language behaviour 'basic' is accordingly not to say that it is not intertwined with other forms of language behaviour.[29]

Indeed, some things, by their very nature, come joined together. Take, for example, Ping and Pang, the Siamese-Twin cats that Alice met in Gilbert Adair's Needle's Eye World. Attached to opposite ends of the same tail, one could not have Ping without getting Pang into the bargain and vice versa. The two physically entailed each other. Things or activities that are more abstract than Siamese cats can stand in the same kind of relation to each other of course. For instance, if there are forms of language behaviour that are in a sense basic, there have to be other forms of language behaviour that are nonbasic. And, indeed, the second layer of linguistic reality includes various **nonbasic or compound forms of language behaviour.**

We have in fact already witnessed an act of language behaviour of a compound sort: Alice's translating the English poem

'Jack and Jill went up the hill

To fetch a pail of water.

Jack fell down and broke his crown,

And Jill came tumbling after.'

into the French:

'Jacques et Jacqueline sont montés à la colline

Pour remplir un gros seau de l'eau.

Jacques est tombé en se cassant le nez,

Jacqueline aussi - '   [*TNE* 94]

But in what sense would translation be a compound form of language behaviour? Primarily, in the sense that it involves combining comprehension and production, two basic forms of language behaviour, in a specific, coordinated way. Secondarily, in the sense that two languages are involved: having comprehended (a set of) utterances in language A (the **source language**) the translator produces (a set of) sufficiently equivalent utterances in language B (the **target language**).

The 'trick' of translation lies in producing utterances in the target language which are in the right ways sufficiently equivalent to the utterances of the source language. These ways include more than meaning, as Alice was able to learn from the following appraisal of her French translation:

> '"Grosso modo" said Jack sagely, completing the rhyme (The phrase is Latin, you see, and it means 'more or less'.) "You were a trifle free with names" - here Jill scowled more than usual at Alice....' [*TNE* 94-95]

The utterances of the target language may be required to be equivalent to those of the source language in using the same kinds of words, phrases or other linguistic forms too.[30]

2.3.2 Means of language behaviour

Asked by Alice what he stood for in the forthcoming election, Gilbert Adair's Emu replied in a rather aggressive tone: 'I stand for everything beginning with an F'. And, to clarify the meaning of this enigmatic statement, he recited a little poem whose closing stanza reads as follows:

'Oh, f's the only letter

    The world can count upon;

For, without f's ther'd be no ifs

    And dreams would end anon. [*TNE* 61]

Despite having listened attentively to the poem, Alice was still far from happy:

'I feel certain it *does* have a meaning somewhere, and I almost understand it already. Perhaps it would be easier for me to follow if I had it written down' [*TNE* 61]

Alice clearly believed that (re)reading offered her a better chance of making sense of the poem. This little episode illustrates the four most important means of behaving linguistically: speaking and writing as means of producing utterances and, complementary to these, listening (or hearing) and reading as means of comprehending utterances. Not illustrated by the episode, are signing as a third productive means and 'seeing' (signs) as a third receptive means. Below we will focus on the pairs of speaking/listening and of writing/reading (signing/'seeing' (signs) is restricted to a very small number of people). From our macroscopic perspective, we will be concerned with the following questions: What is a means of language behaviour? What is the nature of the differences between speaking/listening and writing/reading as the most important pairs of means of behaving linguistically? Is one of these pairs in some sense(s) basic or primary vis-à-vis the other?

What, then, is a means of language behaviour? To get a grip on this question we will start out from the distinction between means of producing utterances and means of comprehending or 'receiving' utterances. A means of producing utterances is distinguished by its using a particular channel for uttering a sentence in a certain medium or substance. Thus, speaking uses the oral (or vocal) channel for uttering a

sentence in a phonic medium; writing normally uses what may be called the 'manual' channel for uttering a sentence in a graphic medium. Note that on this characterization, writing is not the graphic representation of speech sounds or other properties of a spoken utterance signal.

A means of comprehending utterances, by contrast, is distinguished by its using a particular sensory modality for recovering a message uttered in a specific medium. Listening (or hearing) involves the use of the aural or auditory modality for recovering a message uttered in a phonic medium; reading uses the visual modality for recovering a message uttered in a graphic medium. A last point of terminology: as a pair of complementary means, speaking/listening has conventionally been referred to as 'speaking', for short; and, analogously, writing/reading as a pair of complementary means has been referred to for short as 'writing'. Where no misunderstanding can result, we will also follow this abbreviatory terminological convention.[31]

As means of acting linguistically, speaking and writing, then, differ primarily in regard to channel and modality. But there are other differences too if one compares speaking in the canonical setting of face-to-face conversation with writing in the typical setting of the (academic) exposition of ideas or information. The former setting differs in important ways from the latter. In the case of conversational speaking, there are two or more participants present who share space, time and knowledge of each other. Both their production and their comprehension of utterances, moreover, are constrained by what are called 'real-time factors'. Expository writing is typically done in a setting that lacks these features. As a consequence, expository writing and conversational speaking differ from each other in various ways, to three of which we next turn.

Conversational speaking, firstly, is typically more highly interactive than expository writing. The listener(s) or addressee(s) present in the typical setting of face-to-face

conversation can --- and do --- react directly to the speaker's utterances, either verbally or through their body language. Such direct feedback may --- and do --- cause the speaker to modify his/her language behaviour: aborting utterances, 'rerouting' utterances in mid-course as it were, producing additional utterances intended to clarify, amplify, retract etc. earlier utterances, changing the topic and so on. Listener feedback often causes the speaker to give up voluntarily his/her turn to speak. Or he/she may be elbowed out of the conversation by listeners impolitely grabbing a turn to speak.

The highly interactive nature of face-to-face conversation is entertainingly illustrated by the way in which Humpty Dumpty reacted to Alice's verbal and nonverbal intrusions into his speech. Irked by the feedback he was getting from her, he zig-zagged verbally as follows:

> '"Of course I don't think so [that I'd be safer down on the ground]. Why, if I ever *did* fall off [the very narrow wall] - which there's no chance of - but *if* I did -" Here he pursed up his lips, and looked so solemn and grand that Alice could hardly help laughing. "*If* I *did* fall," he went on, "*the King has promised me* - ah, you may turn pale, if you like! You didn't think I was going to say that, did you? *The King has promised me - with his very own mouth* - to - to -"
> "To send all his horses and all his men," Alice interrupted, rather unwisely.
> "Now I declare that's too bad!" Humpty Dumpty cried, breaking into a sudden passion. "You've been listening at doors - and behind trees - and down chimneys - or you couldn't have known it!" [*AIW* 263-264]

Typical expository writing has none of the interactive properties in question, because the readers, some or all of whom may even be unkown to the writer, are typically not present at the time of writing. As a result, of course, expository writing is much less suitable for interactional purposes than is conversational speaking.

Conversational speaking, secondly, is typically **more highly contextualized** than expository writing. Such speaking depends on and makes use of the physical setting and background knowledge shared by the participants. For example, to indicate when or where something happened or will happen speakers can say relatively little, using deictic expressions such as now, then, soon, earlier, later and here, there, above, behind. Listeners are required to infer the intended time or place from their knowledge of the physical context and the knowledge they share with speakers. Expository writing cannot use non-specific situation-dependent reference in this way. Being more decontextualized in the above sense, such writing has to refer to times, places, persons and so on in a more explicit and elaborate way. All of this means that a person speaking in a typical conversational setting can achieve certain purposes by doing linguistically less than one who does his/her writing in a typically expository setting.

Conversational speaking, thirdly, is typically **less highly planned** and **less deliberately executed** than expository writing. This is so because producing and comprehending utterances in a typical conversational setting are activities that are performed in real time. And spoken utterances typically are short-lived phenomena, existing fleetingly only. In a normal conversation - in which two to three words per second are produced - a speaker simply does not have sufficient time to carefully plan, rehearse, manage and edit his/her speech. And the fact that speakers often forget the first part of relatively long spoken utterances affords them even less control over the production of such utterances.

Expository writing, by contrast, is typically less subject to time and memory constraints. A writer normally has enough time to plan, organize and produce his/her utterances more carefully. And the relatively permanent nature of a written utterance allows the writer to revise it over and over, should he/she care to do so. Such revision, moreover, is normally not affected by limitations on the writer's short-term memory.

Like speakers, listeners have relatively little time for processing utterances. They cannot listen again to (unrecorded) spoken utterances, taking their time to sort out problems they might have had in comprehending the utterances. This is why Alice failed to comprehend the following utterance, addressed to her by the Duchess in the course of a face-to-face conversation:

'Never imagine yourself not to be otherwise than what might appear to others that what you were or might have been was not otherwise than what you had been would have appeared to them to be otherwise.' [*AIW* 122]

Alice's response to this utterance --- which the Duchess had produced to 'put more simply' the moral 'Be what you would seem to be' --- is quite unsurprising:

'I think I should understand that better ... if I had it written down: but I can't quite follow it as you say it.' [*AIW* 122]

Reading, typically, is not constrained by time in the way that listening is: readers can reread written utterances, 'digesting' them in a deliberate way in order to get at their meaning. This, incidentally, is the reason why Alice would have preferred a written version of the Emu's poem about the value of f's and their fellow-letters.[32]

The above-mentioned differences between conversational speaking and expository reading do not indicate that, as a means of conveying messages or meaning, speaking is in principle less adequate than writing. That is, speaking and writing do not differ absolutely in regard to the capacity for representing ideas or information. For certain practical reasons it may indeed be better to write something rather than to say it. But in principle messages or meanings are neutral in regard to speaking and writing. There are no messages that can be uttered by writing but not by speaking or vice versa. As for 'utterability', messages are means-independent or **means-neutral**. This is obviously

not to say that both speaking and writing can be used for *all* the purposes considered in par. 2.2.1 above. We have been comparing speaking and writing here from the perspective of one purpose only, namely that of the representation of ideas or information.[33]

But what about the spoken and written utterances that are the products of conversational speaking and expository writing, respectively? Do the linguistic properties of these two types of utterances somehow reflect one or more of the differences between the two means of language behaviour? Many linguists believe that they do. It has been contended, for example, that utterances produced by expository writing tend to be **structurally more complex or elaborate** than utterances produced by conversational speaking. The former utterances are believed to be longer and constructed more tightly, often of components which are complex themselves. In comparison with spoken utterances, written utterances, moreover, have been claimed to be **semantically more explicit** both in the sense of expressing ideas more fully and in the sense of expressing the logical links between these ideas. And, to mention one more alleged difference, utterances produced by expository writing have been taken to be **informationally richer** in that they typically carry more new information than utterances produced by conversational speaking.

These three differences between the two types of utterances in question appear to reflect the fact that expository writing is typically planned in a more careful way and executed in a more deliberate fashion than conversational speaking. But, it has been found that even in a conversational setting people produce utterances that are structurally highly complex, semantically quite explicit, and informationally very rich. Not only members of Lewis Carroll's House of Cards are capable of producing spoken utterances that have these properties. Ordinary people can do so too. This means that the relation between the properties of utterances and the means used to produce them are of an indirect sort.[34]

Viewed from various perspectives, speaking is more basic than writing. Consider, for example, a **phylogenetic perspective**: in the developmental history of the human species, speaking goes much further back than does writing. It is generally believed that at no time in the history of modern man has there existed a society that could not and did not speak. Writing, by contrast, is a relatively late development in this period. It is estimated that our species started to speak between 50,000 and 30,000 BC. People began to write systematically, however, only about 6,000 years ago when the first writing systems were developed in the Near East. And even today there still exist whole communities that are illiterate, lacking the ability to write and read.

Speaking is not only phylogenetically basic: it is fundamental from an **ontogenetic perspective** too. That is, in the development of normal individuals speaking comes before writing. And though they can and do speak in a perfectly normal way, millions and millions of people never learn to read and write. Even Carrollinian worlds are quite ordinary in this regard, not having among their dramatis personae creatures that can read or write without being able to speak or listen as well. Not even the Hairdresser in Needle's Eye World is a real exception in this regard. An Italian, he spoke in Italics, which in Alice's judgement

'... had a queer emphasis to it, and there was something sloping and not quite straight-up-and-down about the pronunciation (and I hope you understand what I mean, for I'm sure I don't).' [*TNE* 50]

What makes the Hairdresser such a delightfully curious character is, of course, his funny way of speaking, not of writing.

In normal children, moreover, the ability to speak develops in a natural way, with conscious learning and deliberate teaching playing an insignificant role in the process.

Learning to write and to read is a different matter altogether, as the majority of literate people will be able to recall. It requires much in the way of conscious learning and formal instruction. Even in Wonderland the Mock Turtle and the Gryphon had to go to school every day to learn Reeling and Writhing in the same way as the Classical languages Laughing and Grief, the branches of Arithmetic called Ambition, Distraction, Uglification and Derision as well as such other subjects as Mystery (Ancient and Modern) and Seaography [*AIW* 128-130].[35]

But what would the point be of observing that speaking is from various perspectives more basic than writing? Certainly not to downgrade the role that writing has played in the development of advanced civilizations such as our own. Even Lewis Carroll would have been hard pressed to dream up a world that was culturally, scientifically and technologically as rich as ours but that utterly lacked writing (or some means of language behaviour functionally equivalent to writing). Indeed, in such a world his own stories would have remained unwritten! No, to observe that speaking is more basic than writing is to stress the point that language behaviour consists primarily in people speaking and listening. The world of language, indeed, is inhabited by creatures belonging to the species of *homo loquens*.

2.3.3 Modes of language behaviour

Still remember Ping and Pang? Well, they were not linked to each other anatomically only. Their behaviour was Siamese-like too: they laughed and cried together and, as Alice discovered to her amazement, they even spoke in tandem:

'... the Cat at her left arched its back, and said in a high piercing voice, "I declare! It [i.e., Alice] speaks - and I imagined - "

" - it was only in fairy-tales -" continued the Cat at her right.

"- that human beings could speak," said the first Cat, abruptly ending the sentence.' [*TNE* 24-25]

Ping and Pang's actions go to show that when it comes to speaking, there are many ways of killing a cat indeed. This point carries over to the language behaviour of ordinary people who --- as individuals, pairs or larger groups --- regularly speak, listen, read and write in a multitude of different ways or modes.

But what is a mode of speaking, listening, reading or writing? Some examples will help us towards an answer to this question. Two of the most common modes have already been inspected in par. 2.3.2 above: conversational speaking in the setting of face-to-face contact and expository (academic) writing. But there are many other modes of language behaviour. Think, for example, of the modes of speaking used commonly in the setting of telephone conversations, of verbal duelling (like playful banter), of conversational storytelling, of talking to oneself, of delivering prepared speeches (including lectures, sermons, etc.), of broadcasting, of sports commentary, of dictating letters, of stock market trading, of drilling a squad of recruits, of auctioning goods, and so on. And there are various different modes of listening too, including those involved in listening intently ('with strained ears') to what someone is saying, in listening absentmindedly or disinterestedly ('with only half an ear') to a speaker, in overhearing accidentally (snatches of) a conversation, in eavesdropping deliberately on people and so forth. As for modes of writing, think of those found in roughly drafting a first version of a (piece of) text (e.g., a news report, a suspense story, a scholarly paper or a poem), in carefully rewriting such a first draft, in quickly jotting down some ideas in telegraphese, in listing or tabulating figures or other data, and so on. Finally, different

modes of reading are evidenced by skimming, by scanning, by close reading, by reading aloud, by proofreading, and so forth.

A mode of speaking, listening, writing or reading, then, is in essence a distinct way of using the means in question. By speaking in a mode A (say conversational speaking) someone does something that differs in one or more typical respects from what he/she does when speaking in a mode B (say giving radio commentary on a horse race). The differences that set two modes of speaking apart stem from differences in how speakers perform one or more of the activities --- conceptualizing, formulating, externalizing (i.e., articulating) and self-monitoring --- that make up speaking. Similarly, differences between distinct modes of listening, between distinct modes of writing or between distinct modes of reading result from performing the component activities of these means of language behaviour in different ways.[36]

Conversational speaking and expository writing are relatively pure modes of speaking and writing, respectively. In between the former, most purely oral, mode of speaking and the latter, most purely literate, mode of writing, there lie various **mixed modes of speaking and writing**. These include oral modes of writing --- i.e., modes of writing whose products are intended to be spoken --- and literate modes of speaking --- i.e., modes of speaking whose products are intended to be written down. All modes of writing texts intended for public delivery --- speeches, formal lectures, sermons etc. --- represent oral modes of writing. Giving unprepared lectures, making off-the-cuff speeches and making impromptu press statements, by contrast, are examples of literate modes of speaking. Certain modes of speaking (e.g., giving prepared formal lectures) and certain modes of writing (e.g., expository writing) are quite similar. The reverse is true too: certain modes of speaking (e.g., conversational speaking) are quite different from certain other modes of speaking (e.g., prepared public speaking). Likewise, certain modes of writing (e.g., writing formal academic expositions) are quite different from certain other modes of writing (e.g., informally writing personal letters).

Observations such as these indicate that speaking (in all its modes) and writing (in all its modes) do not form a simple oral vs. literate dichotomy. There is rather an oral-literate continuum with conversational speaking and expository writing representing opposite poles. Between these lie more/less oral/literate modes of speaking/writing such as those mentioned above.[37]

The kind of mixing involved in the mixed modes of speaking and writing mentioned above differs from the kind of mixing illustrated by Jack's saying to Alice:

'Grosso modo .... You were a trifle free with names, you know ...'

This utterance is a product of Jack's using two languages --- Latin and English --- for encoding a message that he wished to convey to Alice. The kind of mixing illustrated by Jack's utterance --- known as language mixing --- takes on various forms, some of which will be considered in our exploration of the domains of linguistic reality. Someone can, of course, mix at the same time various modes of language and various languages, using, for example, both English and Latin in writing out a sermon to be delivered orally as part of a church service.

But let us return to the observation made at the beginning of par. 2.3, namely that there seems to be a limitless variety of acts of language behaviour. Much of this variety, we can now see, is due to the wide range of modes of speaking, listening, writing and reading. And we have merely scratched the surface, having identified above some of the more commonly used modes only.

There are very many less commonly used modes indeed. Think of the town crier shouting out for all to hear that the whales are back to overwinter in the bay, of Pavarotti carrying on in a high C about a hand that is both tiny and frozen, of Muhammad Ali boasting rhythmically 'Only last week/Ah murdered a rock/Injured a

stone/Hospitalized a brick/Ah'm so mean/Ah made medicine sick'. Or of the pilot urging folk down below in vapour words to 'VOTE TED', of the skinhead spraying his denunciation of the system on the town hall wall, of the stone cutter chipping out on a slab of marble 'Here lies John Doe'. Town crying, opera singing, rapping, skywriting, graffiti spraying and stone engraving are but a few examples of the host of less commonly used modes of producing utterances that make language behaviour such a richly varied layer of linguistic reality. And we have not even begun to look at such quaint modes of language behaviour as those involved in the writing and reading of the Looking-glass book that puzzled Alice with lines such as the following:

JABBERWOCKY

'Twas brillig, and the slithy toves
Did gyre and gimble in the wabe:
All mimsy were the borogoves,
And the mome raths outgrabe.

[*TLG* 191]

2.4   The bounds of language behaviour

Always quick on the draw, the Red Queen was not given to accepting without argument what others had to say about Looking-Glass Country. This Alice found out the hard way when she referred to a rising as a 'hill', only to be summarily contradicted by the Queen:

'When you say "hill" ... I could show you hills, in comparison with which you'd call that a valley.' [*TLG* 207]

And when Alice protested that it would be nonsense to call a hill a 'valley', she was abruptly put down once more:

'You may call it "nonsense" if you like ... but I've heard nonsense, compared to which that would be as sensible as a dictionary!' [*TLG* 207]

So if we were to conclude this chapter by saying that our inspection of the layer of language behaviour revealed it to be an action-packed place, the Red Queen would in all likelihood profess to have seen other places in the world of language, compared to which this layer of land is as lifeless as dust.

And, even allowing for the Queen's tendency to exaggerate, we would have to concede the point. For, as we peer through our macroscope at some of the other large-scale features of the world of language, you will see lots of things happening outside the layer of language behaviour. Take, for example, the case of people acquiring or losing their language(s). Or that of languages being born, growing, changing, declining or dying. Undeniably, language birth, growth, change, decline and death form part of the dynamics of linguistic reality. But these are slow-moving processes which cannot readily be thought of as acts of purposive language behaviour. Linguistic dynamics, that is, should not be equated with language behaviour. The Red Queen would be right to insist that the dynamics of the world of language are by no means exhausted by what happens within the bounds of its behavioural belt.[38]

Notes to Chapter 2

1   Behaviour has turned out to be extremely difficult to characterize adequately in technical terms of any generality. For a discussion of some of the characterizations that have been proposed see, for example, Kaufmann 1967:269, Moravcsik 1990:61 and Botha 1992:73-74.

2   For the notion of 'internal' or 'silent speech' see, for example, Levelt 1989:12-15, 27-28, 469-473 and the literature surveyed there.

3   This utterance is a lexically slightly modified version of an utterance that was actually produced by a schizophrenic patient. For the latter utterance see Maher 1966:395. For some discussion of the utterances (or so-called language) of schizophrenics see, for example, Maher 1966, Chaika 1974, Schwartz 1982 and the 'Open Peer Commentary' on Schwartz 1982.

4   For some discussion of the intentional nature of speech see, for example, Levelt 1989:30, 58ff.

5   The meanings of the other neologisms are given in note 31 below. *'the wabe'* means 'the grass-plot round a sundial' ... ('because it goes a long way before it, and a long way behind it' .... 'and a long way beyond it') [*TLG* 272].

6   Traditionally, no clear distinction has been drawn between the purposes of language behaviour and the so-called functions of language. For relatively recent characterizations and classifications of the latter functions see, for example, Halliday 1970, 1976:27-30, Halliday and Hasan 1985:10ff., Crystal 1987:10ff., Wardhaugh 1993:190-197, Nuyts 1993 and the literature reviewed in these studies. Bühler 1934, Ogden and Richards 1949, Jakobson 1960 and

Hymes 1962 are considered to be 'classics' among the older writings on the 'functions of language'.

7   For the confusion that has resulted from the (mis)use of these ambiguous terms see, for example, Chomsky 1975:53ff., 1980:230, Nuyts 1993:226-228.

8   For a discussion of some of the problems involved in distinguishing among these kinds of meaning see, for example, Lyons 1977: 50ff. For a discussion of the nature of the kind of meaning conveyed by utterances used for the purpose of sensory interaction or so-called critical communication, see Lehrer 1982, 1983, Isenberg 1954.

9   For some discussion of the general nature of turn-taking, of the diversity of turn-taking cues and of the properties of turn-allocation rules see, for example, Duncan 1972, Sacks *et al.* 1974, Duncan and Fiske 1977, Levinson 1983:296ff., Beattie 1983, Denny 1985, Graddol et al. 1987:150-162, Crystal 1987:118, Levelt 1989:30-39 and the literature surveyed or cited in these sources.

10   For an analysis of this exchange between Alice and the Caterpillar see Hardy 1989:227-228. The general aim of Hardy 1989 is to show that pragmatics is the interpretive system that 'best contributes to an understanding of the major themes of [Carroll's] works'.

11   The Cooperative Principle and the four sets of rules --- called 'maxims' --- in terms of which this principle is realized are due to Paul Grice (1975, 1978). Grice's maxims read as follows:

The Maxim of Quality

Try to make your contribution one that is true, specifically

(i)   do not say what you believe to be false

(ii)   do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence

The Maxim of Quantity

(i)   make your contribution as informative as is required for the current purpose of the exchange

(ii)   do not make your contribution more informative than is required

The Maxim of Relation

make your contribution relevant

The Maxim of Manner

be perspicuous, and specifically:

(i)   avoid abscurity

(ii)   avoid ambiguity

(iii) be brief

(iv)   be orderly

For an expository discussion of these conversational maxims see, for example, Levinson 1983:100-118, Levelt 1989:39-44.

12   For a discussion of the nature, functions and types of deixis see, for example, Miller and Johnson-Laird 1976:374ff., Lyons 1977: chap. 15, Levinson 1983:61ff., Allan 1986:37-40, Levelt 1989:45-58.

13   For some discussion of the components and make-up of the context of nonlinguistic (or nonverbal) behaviour see, for example, Bolinger 1980: chapter

2, Scherer and Wallbott 1985, Graddol *et al.* 1987:134-150. Poyatos (1993) discusses in detail what some linguists call 'paralinguistic components' of this context. He (1993:130) defines *paralanguage* as 'the nonverbal voice-qualities, modifiers and independent sounds and silences with which we support or contradict the simultaneous linguistic and kinesic structures'. The paralinguistic phenomena discussed by Poyatos include what he calls *primary (voice) qualities* (e.g., loudness, pitch, timbre, tempo, resonance, rhythm, etc.), *(voice) qualifiers* (e.g., those making a voice 'creaky', 'whispery', 'murmured', 'breathy', 'falsetto', 'harsh', 'shrill', 'metallic', 'husky', 'hoarse', etc.), *differentiators* (e.g., laughing, crying, shouting, yawning, panting, gasping, belching, etc.), and *alternants* (e.g., 'Aah', 'Uh-huh', 'Ooh', 'Ugh', 'Shush', 'Mmm', 'Uh-hu', 'Psst', 'Tut-tut', etc.).

14   For Chomsky's view of novelty as a property of linguistic utterances and of innovativeness (as well as unboundedness in scope) as property and of language use see, for example, Chomsky 1959:32, 56, 1964:77ff., 1972:10-11, Botha 1992:47, 49, 99-100.

15   For Chomsky's case for the view that typical instances of language behaviour are free from stimulus-control see, for example, Chomsky 1959:31-32, 1972a:10-11, Botha 1992:47-49.

16   For Chomsky's position on the appropriateness (and the resulting coherence) of language behaviour see, for example, Chomsky 1972:11-12, 1987c:11.

17   For Chomsky's notion of the 'creative aspect of language use' see, for example, Chomsky 1964:17ff., 1972:10-11, 1987c:11.

18   For Chomsky's view of rule-governedness as a property of language use see, for example, Chomsky 1987a:64, 67, 1987b:20-24.

19   We will take up this point again in par. 2.3.1.1 below.

20   For an excellent technical account of speaking in terms of which conceptualizing, formulating, externalizing (in the form of articulating) and self-monitoring are the major 'processing components' see Levelt 1989. For a less technical discussion along similar lines see Aitchison 1989: chapter 11. Levelt 1989, in addition, offers a detailed account of the micro-level make-up of the four major 'processing components' of speaking, surveying at the same time much of the relevant technical literature. See also Garrett 1988 for a discussion of the so-called processes in language production.

21   Lewis Carroll [*TLG* 191] interpreted the unfamiliar words in the cited stanza as follows:

brillig	:	'the time for broiling dinner'
slithy	:	'smooth and active'
toves	:	'badgers with smooth white hair, long hind legs and short horns; living chiefly on cheese'
gyre	:	'to scratch like a dog'
gimble	:	'to screw out holes in anything'
wabe	:	'the side of a hill'
mimsy	:	'unhappy'
borogoves	:	'parrots that had no wings, beaks turned up: making their nests under sundials and living on veal'
mome	:	'grave, solemn'

raths   :   'land turtles with erect heads, mouths like sharks, curved legs and smooth green bodies: living on swallows and oysters'

outgrabe   :   'squeaked'   [*TLG* 191]

Humpty Dumpty [*TLG* 270-272] gave a more graphic definition of the meaning of some of these words.

22   To see what 25b-c mean, consider 25a-c respectively:

     25a   *The cat grinned; the executioner beheaded this cat; the Queen employed this executioner ...*

      b   *The Queen who was hit the hedgehog hit the (same) hedgehog.*

      c   *The King's horses that were galloped through the rose garden stumbled.*

     25a-b are for systematic reasons hard to comprehend. For these reasons see, for example, Bever 1970, 1974, Botha 1981:227-232, Aitchison 1989:203-216.

23   There is no single study of comprehension that is comparable in scope and depth to Levelt's 1989 work on speaking. For less wide-ranging surveys of recent work on aspects of comprehension see, however, Flores d'Arcais 1988, Garman 1990, and Singer 1990. For a less technical account see Aitchison 1989:chap. 10. There are essentially two families of models of the nature of the relations holding among the various activities or processes involved in the comprehension of utterances. The first, as exemplified by Carroll, Tanenhaus and Bever 1978, comprises so-called serial models; on these, certain processing activities follow one another in a chain-like fashion. The second, as instantiated by Marslen-Wilson, Tyler and Seidenberg 1978, is the family of so-called parallel models; on these, certain processes interact in a parallel way with one another in comprehension. Terminological variation has contributed to the relative inaccessibility of the literature on utterance comprehension. This point is borne

out by the following observation by Flores d'Arcais (1988:97): 'Depending on the area of research and on the interest of the researcher, the term 'perception' has been synonymous with *identification, recognition, discrimination, understanding*, and *comprehension*. In speech perception research, the term covers almost every sensory and perceptual operation, in psycholinguistics the term has been used to designate such diverse processes as word recognition, the segmentation of the speech signal, judgements of similarity between two linguistic structures, and even the comprehension of connected discourse.'

24   For some discussion of the nature and properties of introspection see, for example,

25   For some discussion of the psychological processes involved in analytic thinking see, for example, Hammond 1965, Bruner 1961, Coward 1981:171-172.

26   For an analysis of these sentences see Zepeda 1983.

27   For a detailed survey and appraisal of the psychological and philosophical literature dealing with the nature and properties of intuiting see Coward 1981.

28   According to the literature surveyed in Levelt 1989:460-463, the following aspects of spoken utterances are monitored in this way: meaning or conceptual make-up, contextual appropriateness, sufficiency of the information expressed, lexical choice, syntactic and morphological form, sound-form, and speed, loudness, precision and fluency of articulation.

29   For (alternative accounts of) the specifics of the ways in which production, comprehension and self-monitoring interact see, for example, Levelt 1983, 1989:469ff.

30   For the distinction among various 'kinds' of translation (pragmatic vs. aesthetic vs. ethnographic/sociolinguistic vs. linguistic) and for the distinction among different 'levels' of translation (word-for-word vs. literal vs. free) see Crystal 1987:344-345. For discussions of (some of) the different accounts or 'models' of the processes involved in translation see, for example, Holmes et al. (eds.) 1970, Holmes, Lambert and Van den Broeck (eds.) 1978, and Van den Broeck and Lefevere 1984: chap. 6.

31   The highly complex (clusters of) activities or processes involved at a micro-level in what we have portrayed as using the oral channel (in speaking), using the aural modality (in listening), using the manual channel (in writing) and using the visual modality (in reading) fall beyond our macroscopic perspective on linguistic reality. In regard to speaking, these activities/processes are discussed in detail in Levelt 1989. For a much more restricted account of work done on the micro-mechanics of listening, writing and reading see Crystal 1987: section 34, Garman 1990: paras. 4.3, 4.5 and the literature surveyed there.

32   For some discussion of the differences between speaking and writing see for example Biber 1988:47-58, 101ff., Crystal 1987:178-179, Halliday 1985:92-97, Olson 1993 and the literature surveyed there.

33   For some discussion of functional differences between speaking and writing see, for example, Biber 1988:42-44, Chafe 1982, 1985, Halliday 1989:39-41, 80-82.

34   For a detailed discussion of the linguistic differences between spoken and written utterances see Biber 1988. This discussion offers a good critical survey of other relevant literature too.

35   Speaking has been taken to be basic from a structural and a functional perspective too. Structurally, the smallest units produced in speaking (namely sounds) admit of far fewer combinations than do the smallest units of writing (letters). Functionally, speaking is used for a wider range of purposes than writing is. For a discussion of the various perspectives from which speaking is considered basic see, for example, Lyons 1981a:11-17.

36   As distinct ways of behaving, modes of speaking and of writing differ both from the so-called genres and from the so-called types of the texts produced by speaking or writing. As Biber (1988:70, 171) draws the distinction, genres characterize texts on the basis of (text-external) criteria relating to the speaker's purpose and topic, but text types represent groupings of texts that are similar in their linguistic form, irrespective of genre. For example, an academic article on Asian history belongs to the genre of academic exposition, but its text type might be narrative-like (and more similar to some types of fiction than to scientific or engineering academic articles). In short: genre and text types are to do with (texts as) products of language behaviour; modes of speaking and modes of writing, however, are to do with language behaviour itself.

37   For a discussion of various mixed types and genres of texts see Biber 1988: chaps. 6-8. See, for example, Tannen 1982 and 1985 for a clear articulation of the idea that there is an oral/literate continuum. The more traditional idea of an oral/literate dichotomy is found in, for example, Chafe 1982 and 1985. For (the history of) the cultural dimension of the oral/literate continuum see Edwards and Sienkewicz 1990:6-11 and the literature surveyed there.

38.   Some of the protracted linguistic processes mentioned above will be examined in later chapters of this study.

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